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Risks and Implications
for Decision-Making Processes
Associated with Existing Design Codes or Their Non-Existence
Jan Błachut∗, Dariusz Sala∗
Abstract. The buckling phenomenon is a perplexing and unresolved issue in many safety
critical structures; as a result, it has been heavily regulated. The existence of regulations
would normally benefit modern decision-making tools. But there are various obstacles coming
from real-life situations. In order to illustrate the above and draw awareness to the problem,
the paper chooses the buckling of shells and discusses (i) the case of an internally pressurized
dome found in a plane’s fuselage that failed during a routine flight, (ii) a case where advances
in structural mechanics challenge the existing design codes (i.e., metallic domes in pressure
vessels), and (iii) a case of extracting rich seabed resources where efficient buoyancy units are
required. In the last-mentioned case, the paper points towards the use of advanced Carbon
Fiber Plastics (CFRPs) and illustrates this by a failed CFRP dome manufactured from
a woven fabric (a topic still within the research sphere of activities). Cases of several other
industrial failures caused by buckling are also provided. Finally, the paper highlights the risks
to the decision-making processes due to the growing tendencies of eliminating the records of
disastrous events from public domains through confidentiality arrangements and the erosion
of the existing human know-how.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, computer programs are responsible for a large portion of the decision-
-making processes. This applies to many industrial activities. Computer codes facilitate
the identification of processes, help analyze and interpret data, and estimate the
consequences of any decisions made. These decision support systems are meant to
cover all phases of the decision-making process; e.g., Keen, Scott-Morton (1978),
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Power (1999). The origin of their development is usually associated with the Carnegie
Institute of Technology and MIT. The latter is credited with the development of the
first codes aimed at automated/structured decision making (Power, 1999). The current
systems tend to apply modern techniques of data acquisition and processing. This
includes active computer systems (self-learning and/or adaptive) that are capable
of adjusting themselves to the need of a specific decision making requirement and
environment. It is worth noting that such systems are capable of dealing with imperfect
data like imprecision, lack of consistency, limited certainty, etc. They are also capable
of delivering strategic recommendations as well as detailed operational reports for
a given industrial entity based on their own data – see Figure 1.
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Fig. 1. Scheme of decision-making processes and their interaction (Sala, 2007, p. 35)
There are also decision support systems that have on-line access to data and
to analytical decision-making models. This in turn can efficiently support decision
processes, especially when standard computer programs of lower rankings are either
unable to find solution or it would be uneconomical to use them. A subset of computer
support systems provides information for top company management personnel. These
executive information systems (as they are called) gather relevant data from across
all levels of a company, sort it out, and prepare it in a format that can explicitly
help managers to make efficient decisions on a day-to-day basis. A further level of
an executive information system is associated with partially processed data, some
conclusions made, and the available partial interpretations and recommendations. This
kind of information system is aimed at top levels of managers who make strategic
decisions. Another form of a decision support system is based on the use of business
intelligence (Biere, 2003). This kind of system uses data from all available sources as
well as data about the personnel’s know-how as well as the experience of all those who
are involved in the business decisions. Elements of feedback from the consumers and
partners are also included in this kind of system modus operandi – see Figure 2.
The inclusion of a feedback loop into decision making has created a superior
tool (as expected). For example, users become aware of past decisions, the corrective
actions taken, and the sensitivities of the adjustments. Fresh inputs can be added
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to the system as new technologies emerge or business environment changes. Bits of
information related to corporation individuals and their involvement in a company’s
well-being, creativity, and motivations are also gathered. They constitute personal
information about the company and give managers a better appreciation of the
corporation workforce (Szyjewski, 2003).
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Fig. 2. Illustration of information systems and their relative positioning, (Sala, 2007, p. 36)
A relatively new development in decision-making processes is associated with
data mining. The recovered data is usually subjected to online analytical processing,
which provides the instigator with a multi-faceted analysis of the data found.
At face value, the above approaches can deal with imprecise/incomplete data and
estimate the consequences of the decisions made. But it is unclear how (if at all) the
support systems can deal with some engineering activities where a high level of safety is
required due to the dangerous phenomenon associated with buckling (e.g., Singer et al.,
2002; Błachut, 2014). In cases like these, safety design codes have been developed and
they have become legally binding in many instances. Virtually all countries have sets
of their own rules; e.g., British Standards in the U.K. (BS), Industrial Standards in
Germany (DIN), or Polish Standards in Poland (PN). One specific area where these
standards are applied is related to pressure vessels. Despite the advances in science,
manufacturing, and materials, these design codes still rely on phenomenological data
obtained from experiments over the past decades (Singer et al., 2002). Pressure vessels
are used across industries on land, under the sea, and in the air. Their primary loading
is usually internal or external pressure. As far as the geometry is concerned, they are
built from cylindrical shells closed by domed ends. One perplexing issue (and still
not satisfactorily resolved) is the large sensitivity of load-carrying capacity to initial
geometric imperfections. This is particularly present in axially compressed cylinders
and externally pressurized domed closures due to the possibility of buckling. In what
follows, the paper mainly concentrates on domed closures onto cylindrical vessels.
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2. SCOPE
This paper aims to highlight buckling/collapse issues in pressurized domed closures.
On one hand, the design codes are meant to secure the safe use of pressure components;
however, the arrival of new business opportunities require the codes to be upgraded or
even developed. This, however, is a slow process, and the safety of vital engineering
tasking can only be secured by the rigorous application of tried and reliable methodol-
ogies. As advances in mechanics, computations, and materials challenge the existing
design by rule approaches, the paper identifies some bottlenecks that are likely to
affect automated decision support processes.
3. BACKGROUND
One intense and important human activity at the frontier of technological development
is deep-sea exploration. It transpires that, at the moment, there is a quiet colonization
of the oceans’ seabeds. While the extraction of oil and gas from seabeds has continued
for several decades, it is the availability of rare raw material that drives deep-sea
research (cobalt, copper, manganese, silver, tungsten, gold, etc.). In many instances,
it is estimated that these materials can be extracted at 30% of on-land costs. There
are only a few nations that have the required manned vehicles capable of reaching
a depth of 6 km – see Figure 3 (with the Chinese Jiaolong vehicle rated at 7 km just
announced).
 
Business Intelligence 
Fig. 3. Access to seabed versus exploration depth (current and planned). Available vehicles
are also denoted (A ≡ current, North Sea; B ≡ current, Gulf of Mexico, coastal
waters of Brazil & Nigeria; C ≡ planned, researched)
The main technological obstacles are the availability of sufficient buoyancy units.
These are shells of hemispherical, torispherical, or elliptical shapes. Their strength
is greatly affected by sensitivity to small deviations from a perfect shape. Hence, all
Risks and Implications for Decision-Making Processes . . . 9
experimental data for metallic heads has been collated, and a lower bound was drawn
to them. Next, a safety zone was proposed by lowering the design curve (as shown in
Figure 4).
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Fig. 4. Lower bound to known experimental data and design curve with safety margin
For a while, designers remained assured that no failure could occur within a safety
buffer zone. But this comfort has been removed by advanced computations backed by
the testing of industrial and laboratory shells shown in Figure 5 (Błachut, 1998).
 
Fig. 5. Illustration of how safety margin has been compromised by experimental test data
This implies that an additional safety margin has to be considered for a specific
product and its application. Industries have looked for new materials from which
buoyancy units could be made. One possibility was for domes manufactured from
composites (CFRP = Carbon Fiber Reinforced Plastics). But the results of these
expensive research programs are not instantly available in the public domain – mostly
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due to their commercial/security sensitivity. Sponsors of research into novel structures
frequently remove critical information from the public domain. A good example is the
study by Didier (2014), where the supplement containing critical experimental data
and conclusions was only available to examiners during the PhD viva and then made
confidential.
4. CASE STUDIES
There are situations where no design code exists and structures have to be built in
accordance with the best know-how at a time, which sometimes does not secure a safe
future use of a product (as illustrated next).
4.1. FAILURE OF REAR BULKHEAD
Consider an L1011-385 wide-body airplane that has been in service for decades and
is capable of carrying 400 passengers and 20 air crew. On a flight from Tenerife to
Manchester in 1995 (when the aircraft was approximately halfway between Tenerife
and Faro), the flight crew heard a loud bang. As the cabin pressure started to change,
the flight crew released the oxygen masks, and the aircraft immediately commenced
an emergency descent. Apart from the pressurization failure, the aircraft had handled
normally. During the transit to Faro, 4000 kg of fuel was dumped to reduce the aircraft’s
landing weight to 160,000 kg; it then landed safely. As the decompression happened at
the rear bulkhead, it was the subject of careful investigation at Farnborough/UK by
the Air Accident Investigation Board (AAIB, 1996). The rear pressure bulkhead is
a thin-shell structure comprising a series of one-mm-thick panels lap-jointed to form
a dome-shaped pressure membrane of an approximately hemispherical profile. On the
passenger side, the shell was reinforced by a grid of stringers and rings (as seen in
Figure 6).
Fig. 6. View of rear bulkhead in L1011 wide-body plane reinforced by stringers and rings
on internal passenger side
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The purpose of the reinforcing grid was to limit the size of any rupture that
might occur. The apparent cause of the cabin depressurization was a rupture of the
skin within one grid cell. It transpired that, during each flight, the skin buckled after
take-off and snapped back to normal shape before landing. The large number of these
‘in’ and ‘out’ buckling snaps caused fatigue in the material and the subsequent fracture.
Luckily, the venting of cabin pressure did not damage other vital elements of the
aircraft structure in this case. A catastrophic structural failure that can follow from
a pressure bulkhead failure due to the release of pressurized cabin air into parts of the
aft fuselage let to a major accident of a Japan Airlines Boeing 747 in 1985, resulting in
the deaths of more than 500 people. The rear bulkhead of the B747 had only stringer
reinforcements (see Fig. 7); when the rupture occurred, the increased flow of cabin air
effectively disabled the aircraft.
Fig. 7. Fragments of recovered rear bulkhead of JAL B747 plane in Tokyo airport museum
It must be said that predicting the buckling of a rear bulkhead under operational
loading is difficult. At the time when the above wide-body aircraft were designed (in
the sixties and early seventies of the last century), there were no reliable tools for
predicting this mechanism of failure. Equally surprising were the crash investigator’s
recommendations in the case of the B747, which merely stated ‘redesign the rear
bulkhead’ without giving any reasons behind the statement. After the occurrence of
the above two cases, a major effort was directed towards the safety of rear bulkheads.
The difficulty of predicting a ‘buckling dimpling’ of a grid-reinforced structure is also
illustrated in Figure 8. It shows a glider’s skin in a buckled condition (dimples), which
disappears after another maneuver of the glider. In this instance, the internal grid
reinforcement secures the integrity of the wing. But after many ‘in’ and ‘out’ buckling
snaps, the skin can rupture; this can lead to the free fall of the glider.
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Fig. 8. View of dangerous inward dimples in wings of glider (with permission
of Dr D. Bushnell, Lockheed Martin, Palo Alto (Bushnell, Bushnell, 2017))
4.2. FAILURE OF COMPOSITE DOME
CFRP domes have been researched for their possible use in deep-sea activities. As
with each novel program, one had to address the manufacturing processes and develop
a theoretical predictive method for the buckling/collapse of these pressure components.
Figure 9 depicts a collapsed 30-ply CFRP head made from draped carbon fabric
(Błachut, 2014).
Fig. 9. Photograph of failed 0.8-m-diameter CFRP dome
Risks and Implications for Decision-Making Processes . . . 13
A question here arises on how the accumulation of the know-how in this research
program can efficiently be used in automated decision-making tools? One approach
might be ‘wait and see.’ But this may equally lead to the loss of business opportunities
once others can take these vanguard developments on board.
4.3. FAILURE OF IMPERFECT DOME
As mentioned earlier, imperfections in domes seriously affect the magnitude of their
buckling strength (i.e., they lower it). Consider as an example a CFRP torisphere in
which two types of shape imperfections exit. The first one is affine to an eigenshape,
and the second corresponds to a local inward dimple. A sample of the computed results
is depicted in Figure 10.
Fig. 10. Sensitivity of buckling pressure (p) to amplitude of inward shape deviation (δ)
It is seen here that the amplitude of imperfection amounting to one wall thick-
ness (t) reduces the load carrying capacity by 75%. This is a very serious erosion
of buckling strength. But shape imperfection is not the only possible contribution
responsible for lowering the load-carrying capacity. There are imperfections in material
properties, boundary conditions, load application, or variation in the wall thickness.
The ongoing research here is unable to resolve these issues unequivocally – see: Shell
Buckling Imperfection Sensitivity, Chapter in Bushnell, Bushnell (2017). Hence, the
accumulated know-how backed by selective experimentation is required for the contin-
uous upgrade of design codes. It is worth noting here that NASA (NASA, 1969), for
example, is still using the design rule for imperfect structures that were developed in
the sixties of the last century.
4.4. PICTURES OF FAILED INDUSTRIAL VESSELS
The study by Catriona de Paor (2010) provides a number of failed industrial structures
where buckling was the responsible mode. It can be seen in Figure 11 how application-
-wide and costly these failures can be. Many industrial failures are, unfortunately,
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hidden from the public eye. It appears that the main cause of this is associated with
pending legal processes and worries about the professional standing/image of the
companies.
a) b)
c) d)
Fig. 11. Sample of structures failed due to insufficient buckling strength Note:
cases ‘b’ & ‘c’ from Catriona de Paor (2010)
5. CLOSURE AND CONCLUSIONS
It is clear from the above that engineering activities where buckling is a possibility
constitutes a challenging environment for decision-making processes. Within the area of
existing design codes, one can accept solutions with a reasonable confidence (although
they might appear too conservative at first sight). It is essential here that one has to
carefully adhere to the recommended envelopes of shape, loading, boundary conditions,
materials, etc. Here, however, it has been recently argued that modern computing
tools can be used to replace the existing rules (mostly based on experimentation). The
term ‘design by analysis’ has now been coined (Rotter, 2018). It appears that this
route has to be used very carefully and only by skilled personnel. At the moment, it is
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unclear how the future of this strategy will unfold. Saying that, decision processes will
have to take notice of this development.
At the frontiers of human activities (deep-sea exploration, missions to Mars,
nano-technology) where definitive business answers are fuzzy, it is felt that active
monitoring should suffice for the moment.
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